THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
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Contracts -- Retainer agreements -- Attorney's fees -- Prevailing party -- Mutuality of obligation -- Trial court erred in determining that former client, who prevailed in former counsel's action seeking unpaid attorney's fees, was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105(7) and a provision in parties' retainer agreement stating that former client would reimburse law firm for fees incurred in the event former client later decides it does not want to pursue a lawsuit that firm previously filed on its behalf -- Plain language of agreement does not provide for prevailing party attorney's fees for contract enforcement -- Trial court further erred by awarding attorney's fees pursuant to section 627.428 where motion for fees did not seek fees under that statute
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Torts -- Automobile accident -- Complaint -- Amendment -- Punitive damages -- Action brought against online car sharing platform after one of the tires on the car rented by plaintiffs blew out and resulted in death of a passenger -- Trial court erred by granting plaintiffs' motion to amend to add claim for punitive damages where plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under section 768.72 to make a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages -- Allegations and supporting evidence did not provide a “reasonable basis” for recovery under a theory of intentional misconduct where allegations and the evidentiary support, taken together, fail to show that defendant had actual knowledge that tire warning light in vehicle had been illuminated prior to allowing vehicle to be shared by vehicle owner on the platform -- Allegations and supporting evidence did not provide a “reasonable basis” for recovery under a theory of gross negligence -- Defendant's alleged constructive knowledge of a faulty warning light combined with its failure to restrict access to that vehicle does not reasonably show that defendant's conduct was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to plaintiffs' life, safety, or rights
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Torts -- Automobile accident -- Vicarious liability -- Exoneration rule -- Plaintiff struck by vehicle driven by employee of defendant who was delivering pizzas for one of defendant's franchises -- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant based on finding that, because plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the employee driver from the action after the statute of limitations window would have closed, the voluntary dismissal constituted an adjudication on the merits for purposes of assessing the liability of the vicarious tortfeasor -- Discussion of common law “exoneration rule” and supreme court's decision in Tsuji v. Fleet -- Tsuji did not apply to instant case where plaintiff's suit against both driver and defendant was timely -- The time of filing of the lawsuit is the only applicable time period in this case, and it is at that point in time one must look to see whether the employee was still subject to liability -- Since suit against employee driver was filed well within the statute of limitations, defendant was at that time subject to vicarious liability if its employee driver acted negligently during the course and scope of her employment -- Furthermore, a voluntary dismissal under rule 1.420 dos not operate as an adjudication on the merits
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Wrongful death -- Medical malpractice -- Causation -- Evidence -- Expert -- Appeals -- Standard of review -- Action alleging that defendants' failure to timely diagnose and treat infant's whooping cough caused infant's death -- Trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding plaintiff's causation experts under Daubert and section 90.702 -- Trial court's reliance on deposition transcripts rather than live hearing does not give appellate court de novo review -- Appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion -- While an expert does not have to establish causation conclusively to be admissible, a reasonable judge could conclude that the expert testimony proffered was not sufficiently reliable and/or would not assist the jury in determining whether a delay in antibiotics more likely than not caused infant's untimely death -- Opinion of heart surgeon and pediatric critical care doctor who treated two infants, at most, was not based on sufficient facts or data or produced using a reliable methodology -- Epidemiologist consultant did not provide a scientifically reliable basis for his opinion that infant would probably have survived if she had received antibiotics sooner -- Expert certified in pediatric critical care medicine failed to reliably apply her principles and methods to the facts of the case in a manner that would assist the jury -- Opinion of expert certified in infectious disease was properly excluded where expert could only say that survival was possible had antibiotics been administered sooner
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Criminal Law Headnotes (Jump to Civil Law Headnotes)

THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
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Criminal law -- Child abuse -- Mental injury -- Evidence -- Judgment of acquittal -- Defendant charged with felony child abuse predicated on “an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in mental injury to a child” under section 827.03(1)(b)2. -- Error to deny motion for judgment of acquittal where state failed to provide expert testimony supporting contention that defendant's act of bringing victim's child to a planned robbery where the victim was killed was an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in mental injury to child -- The definition of “mental injury” in section 827.03(1)(d) requires “mental injury” to be supported by expert testimony -- Court rejects argument that subsection (1)(d)'s definition of “mental injury” should only apply to “mental injury” as used in subsection (1)(b)1., which requires actual injury, and not to “mental injury” as used in subsection (1)(b)2.
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