THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
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Bonds -- Public construction -- Non-payment under bond -- Notice -- Action brought against general contractor and surety claiming entitlement to payment from public construction bond pursuant to section 255.05 after subcontractor failed to pay plaintiff materialman for materials it had provided -- No error in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on their fraudulent notice of non-payment defense -- A notice of non-payment is fraudulent if the claimant prepared the notice with such willful and gross negligence as to amount to a willful exaggeration -- It does not necessarily matter that claimant genuinely believed it was entitled to everything it claimed -- Because materials plaintiff furnished were not specially fabricated, plaintiff could recover on bond only for qualifying materials actually incorporated into the project -- No reasonable trier of fact could conclude that plaintiff did not prepare notice with such willful and gross negligence as to amount to willful exaggeration where, without conducting any investigation whatsoever into amount to which it was actually entitled, plaintiff claimed every dollar billed to subcontractor, including legal fees and materials not incorporated into project -- Plaintiff's exaggerated claim did not constitute a minor mistake or error where claim contained more unauthorized items than authorized ones
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Costs -- Prevailing party -- Entitlement to costs -- Proper standard -- Trial court erred by denying plaintiff's motion for costs pursuant to section 57.041 where plaintiff recovered judgment -- Discussion of standard for award of costs -- The prevailing party standard governing attorney's fees awards does not apply when determining entitlement to costs under section 57.041 -- Under statute's plain language, the party that recovered judgment is entitled to costs -- Plaintiff in instant action is the party that recovered judgment where it was awarded damages on two of its three claims and defendants recovered nothing on their counterclaim -- Fact that plaintiff sought more damages than it was awarded does not render ultimate monetary judgment a losing proposition -- Conflict certified
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Insurance -- Liability -- Coverage -- Declaratory judgment -- Default -- Vacation -- Standing -- Action by insurer seeking declaration that no coverage existed for certain claim, brought against its insured and certain potential third-party claimants who contended they were injured by insured's negligence and planned to seek payment from insurance proceeds as third-party beneficiaries, but who had not yet obtained a settlement or verdict in their favor -- Trial court erred in finding that third-party claimants lacked standing to challenge insurer's motion for final default judgment against insured based on fraud and failure to cooperate after insured failed to appear because they had not obtained a settlement or verdict in their favor as required by section 626.3136 -- Under circumstances, the trial court erred in its blanket determination that the third-party claimants whom insured included in its no-coverage action lacked any standing to contest a declaration that would preclude them from claiming a right to payment from the proceeds of policy if and when they obtain the verdict or settlement -- Remand for further proceedings
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Insurance -- Property -- Windstorm loss -- Coverage -- Dismissal -- Limitation of actions -- Equitable estoppel -- Trial court erred by dismissing insured's amended complaint for failure to comply with five-year statute of limitations where complaint alleged facts supporting an equitable avoidance of the limitations period -- Complaint alleged facts that, if proven, could support an equitable defense and avoid statute of limitations where complaint alleged that insured timely reported the hurricane loss and submitted a sworn proof of loss to insurer; insurer failed to make a coverage determination until after statute of limitations had expired after repeatedly requiring additional examinations and investigative steps not required under the policy; and, because coverage determination was a condition precedent to filing suit, insurer's delays prevented insured from initiating litigation before limitations period expired -- Insurer's contrary arguments, which claimed that insured caused the delays and failed to comply with post-loss obligations, were affirmative defenses that could not be resolved at the pleading stage -- Appellate court declines to apply tipsy coachman doctrine based on insurer's alternative argument that section 95.11(2)(e) operates as a statute of repose not subject to equitable doctrines where trial court never ruled on alternative basis -- Remand for trial court to consider statute-of-repose argument in the first instance
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Insurance -- Uninsured motorist -- Bad faith -- Discovery -- Depositions -- Attorney-client privilege -- Work product -- Waiver -- Appeals -- Certiorari -- Trial court departed from essential requirements of the law by compelling attorney who represented insured in her pursuit of underlying UM claim to undergo a second deposition to answer insurer's questions regarding insured's willingness to settle the UM claim for less than policy limits and the attorney's evaluation of that claim -- Discussion of attorney-client privilege and work product -- Trial court's order impermissibly requires attorney to testify about privileged communications with insured and implicitly finds that insured's filing of her bad faith action was itself a waiver of attorney-client and work product privileges -- Although one of the elements of bad faith action is proof that insurer “could” have settled the claim, proof of insured's claim does not “necessarily require” the disclosure of communications between her and her attorney or even identification of topics they discussed -- Unless evidence is necessarily required, insured's attorney-client privilege has not been waived -- Insurer cannot waive insured's privilege for her by raising her alleged unwillingness to settle as a defense -- Court rejects argument that work product objections are not applicable in bad faith actions -- Parties in bad faith actions must adhere to the dictates of rule 1.280(c)(4), which requires the party seeking to overcome the work product privilege to show the need for specific materials and that it is unable to obtain materials by other means without undue hardship -- Because undue hardship was not addressed, insurer did not satisfy its burden of establishing that the work product sought was discoverable
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Real property -- Tax deed -- Quiet title -- Adverse possession -- Limitation of actions -- Action seeking quiet title and ejectment alleging that plaintiff acquired title to property via tax deed years before defendants recorded their warranty deed -- Trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of defendants based on finding that complaint was time-barred pursuant to section 95.191 because action was not initiated within four years of issuance of tax deed -- The bar to a tax deed holder seeking a quiet title action applies only where the property is adversely possessed when the tax deed is recorded -- Because evidence was conflicting as to whether property was adversely possessed, summary judgment was improper
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Real property -- Waterfront property -- Riparian rights -- Interference -- Reasonableness test -- Equitable distribution -- Properties bordering lake comprised of sovereign submerged land -- Action filed by adjacent land owners seeking declaratory judgment and injunction requiring defendants to modify their dock/boathouse to protect plaintiff's riparian rights, including rights to view and access to lake -- Trial court did not err by applying test of reasonableness and equitably determining that defendants' dock/boathouse did not unreasonably interfere with any of plaintiffs' lake-related riparian rights, rather than applying equitable distribution test and apportioning the metes and bounds of the parties' respective riparian rights with regards to the state-owned sovereign submerged land located beyond their respective property boundaries -- Discussion of riparian rights, their intersection with the public trust doctrine that governs sovereign submerged lands, and the equitable distribution test set forth in Florida Supreme Court's decision in Hayes v. Bowman -- Trial court was not legally required to equitably allocate the specific riparian areas within which the parties may exercise their respective riparian rights under Hayes -- Hayes only requires the equitable distribution test to be applied in cases involving the statutory granting of bulkheading privileges to upland owners in the direction of the channel, or as near in the direction of the channel as practicable to equitably distribute the submerged lands -- Test for disputes between riparian proprietors over publicly-owned lake bottoms is whether one riparian owner's use of the lake unreasonably interferes with another riparian owner's use of the lake -- A riparian-rights holder does not necessarily have a right to an equitable metes-and-bounds line drawing of where the holder's riparian rights to use sovereign submerged lands located beneath a lake exist -- In the absence of a statutory requirement, or an actual unreasonable interference with a riparian owner's use of the waters of a lake that may necessitate line drawing under some set of facts, courts are not in the business of divvying up the metes and bounds usage of what is quintessentially public property for use by private individuals with reciprocal riparian rights to a lake -- Conflict certified
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Criminal Law Headnotes (Jump to Civil Law Headnotes)

THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
To see others not presented here, log in for more comprehensive weekly listings.

Criminal law -- Double jeopardy -- Sexual battery on person between ages 12 and 18 by person in position of familial or custodial authority -- Unlawful sexual activity with minor -- Defendant's dual convictions arising from the same criminal episode and involving the same victim do not violate double jeopardy where each offense requires proof of an element the other does not -- Although conduct constituting the charge of sexual battery by person in position of familial or custodial authority may also constitute the conduct charged in unlawful sexual activity, this is not necessarily the case -- Elements of the crimes are distinct where, unlike crime of unlawful sexual activity, defendant's sexual battery charge requires the offender to be in a position of familial and custodial authority, and unlike the sexual battery charge, the crime of unlawful sexual activity requires the offender to be at least twenty-four or older -- Additionally, unlawful sexual activity charge requires the victim to be sixteen or seventeen and sexual battery charge requires victim to be between ages of twelve and eighteen
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Criminal law -- Evidence -- Exhibits -- Objection -- Appeals -- Pretrial objections to exhibits state sought to admit at trial were waived, and objection was not preserved for appellate review, where defense counsel affirmatively stated “no objection” when state later sought to admit evidence at trial -- Although rule 90.104(1)(b) provides that counsel need not renew an objection or offer proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal once a court has made a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, counsel can abandon the issue by stating that he has no objection when subsequently asked about it
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Criminal law -- Probation revocation -- Sentencing -- Violent felony offender of special concern -- Eligibility -- Determination by judge rather than jury -- Defendant previously placed on sex-offender probation for possession of child sexual abuse material -- U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. U.S. does not bar a trial court from finding that a defendant is a VFOSC or that a VFOSC is a danger to the community -- Erlinger does not require a jury to find fact of defendant's prior conviction for purposes of VFOSC designation -- Florida Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. State regarding public-danger determinations under section 775.082(10) does not apply to sentencing of a VFOSC defendant -- Community-danger finding under section 948.06(8)(e)1. only impacts whether a VFOSC probationer could be restored to probation, or must have his probation revoked and be sentenced up to the statutory maximum prison sentence, or longer if permitted by law -- Any increase in defendant's sentence was from the VFOSC finding, which can be based on a trial court's determining defendant's past criminal convictions without violating the Sixth Amendment
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