THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
To see others not presented here, log in for more comprehensive weekly listings.

Arbitration -- Vacation of award -- When there is pending civil action involving parties' agreement to arbitrate, express statutory scheme set forth in chapter 682 requires a motion to vacate the arbitration award be filed in that pending action -- Final order dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's independent action to vacate arbitration award affirmed
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Contracts -- Venue -- Forum selection clause -- Permissive/mandatory -- Forum selection clause stating that rights of the parties “shall be subject to the jurisdiction of and be construed according to the laws of the State of Florida, with venue in Collier County” -- Martin County trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract action for improper venue based on determination that underlying agreement mandated venue in Collier County -- Mandatory language “shall” only applied to the choice of Florida law rather than to the venue selection, which is set off by a comma and cannot be modified grammatically by the language “shall be subject to” -- Because forum selection clause is permissive and cause of action accrued in Martin County, Martin County was a proper venue
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Insurance -- Property -- Windstorm loss -- Coverage -- Post-loss obligations -- Prompt notice -- Prejudice -- Rebuttable presumption -- Applicability -- Claim filed two years and ten months after hurricane made landfall -- No error in granting summary judgment on issue of prompt notice where undisputed evidence established that roof tiles and shingles had been displaced, damaged, or blown off roofs immediately following hurricane and that insured had suspected wind-driven rain had caused flashing leaks that were reported two months after hurricane -- In finding that insurer was prejudiced by the failure to provide prompt notice, trial court erred by applying presumption of prejudice in favor of insurer in its analysis -- Insurer was required to set forth evidence that the failure to promptly report the claim actually prejudiced its investigation where policy stated that insurer has “no duty to provide coverage under the policy if the failure to comply with the following listed duties is prejudicial to us” -- By including prompt notice in list of duties to which no common law presumption applies, insurer removed any presumption of prejudice for the failure to provide prompt notice -- Conflict certified -- Even if presumption of prejudice did apply, evidence plaintiff presented in opposition to motion for summary judgment was sufficient to overcome presumption -- Trial court improperly weighed evidence and made credibility determinations when it rejected opinion of plaintiff's expert engineer
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Municipal corporations -- Ordinances -- Land use -- Sexually oriented businesses -- Pre-existing nonconforming uses -- Change of ownership -- City's adoption of ordinance adding a definition of “change of ownership” to portion of code that regulates sexually oriented businesses located within certain tourism corridors did not substantially change the actual list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category so as to trigger the specific notice procedures in section 166.041(3)(c) -- Ordinance did not, as trial court concluded, “substantially affect the use of the land,” but merely clarified when a sexually oriented business loses its nonconforming-use privilege to operate within tourism corridors -- Trial court erred in holding that 100% stock sale was not a change of ownership because corporate entity remained the same -- Remand for adjudication of remaining claims challenging validity and effect of ordinance on which trial court did not rule because of its finding that there was no change of ownership
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Real property -- Commercial property -- Unlawful detainer -- Ejectment -- Deposit of rent in court registry -- Mandamus -- Petition seeking to compel trial court to enter default final judgment for writ of possession on claim of unlawful detainer -- Defendant's failure to pay rent into registry by first day of the month violated trial court's rent order, constituted a waiver of all of defendant's defenses, and entitled plaintiff to immediate possession of the property -- Trial court erred in determining that, because first day of the month fell on a Sunday when court was closed, rule 2.514(a) effectively extended rent order's requirement to the second day of the month -- Rule 2.514(a)'s Sunday extension applies only when a “period of time” is being construed, and rent order did not require rental payments into the court's registry by reference to any “period of time” -- Petition granted
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Torts -- Civil theft -- Attorney's fees -- Appellate -- Jurisdiction -- Order determining reasonable appellate attorney's fees and costs is affirmed -- Court rejects argument that trial court lacks jurisdiction to award fees because motion to determine amount of fees was untimely under rule 1.525 -- Rule did not apply where appellate court had already determined entitlement to fees in prior appeal and remanded to trial court solely to establish the amount -- Appellate court had jurisdiction to award fees in prior appeal under section 772.11, which entitles a defendant to recover reasonable attorney's fees in the trial and appellate courts upon a finding that claimant raised a claim that was without substantial fact or legal support, where complaint raised a civil theft claim under the statute and trial court had found that appellant's claims were frivolous and warranted sanctions under section 57.105(1) -- Trial court's section 57.105(1) findings satisfied section 772.11's requirement that trial court make an express finding that the appellant's claim was without substantial fact or legal support -- Trial court was not required to make an independent determination of entitlement to fees after entitlement was established by appellate mandate -- Appellant was afforded sufficient due process before fees were awarded where trial court held three days of evidentiary hearings and appellant participated in the hearings -- Trial court did not commit reversible error by adopting proposed order verbatim where no circumstances created appearance that trial court did not make an independent decision -- Award of fees was not premature where no pending motions needed to be resolved and underlying final judgment had already been affirmed -- Appellant had no right to a jury trial in a hearing over amount of fees -- Argument that trial court failed to apportion fees between civil theft and other claims was not preserved for appeal -- Even if preserved, section 772.11 issues were so intertwined with the complaint's other fraud allegations that segregation of the work done would have been impractical -- Counsel was entitled to fees for time she expended representing herself -- Fact that counsel did not sign appellate filings is not dispositive of the compensability of her time -- Award of attorney's fees does not require proof that client actually paid attorney -- Costs -- Experts -- Expert witness fees were recoverable as taxable costs under section 57.041(1) and section 92.231(2) -- Trial court's finding regarding reasonableness of fees was supported by competent substantial evidence -- Trial court was not required to determine counsel's alleged fraud, unclean hands, and inequitable conduct before awarding fees where such allegations were raised in underlying complaint and rejected in final summary judgment on merits -- Furthermore, appellate court's mandate determining entitlement to fees was law of the case -- Pro se filings -- Citation to non-existent or inapplicable legal authority -- Use of generative artificial intelligence -- Order to show cause why appellant should not be barred from further pro se filings
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Criminal Law Headnotes (Jump to Civil Law Headnotes)

THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
To see others not presented here, log in for more comprehensive weekly listings.

Criminal law -- Counsel -- Consultation -- Limitations -- Trial court did not reversibly err by prohibiting defendant from consulting with his lawyer during five-minute recess taken while defendant was testifying in his own defense -- Discussion of Florida Supreme Court's decisions in Bova v. State and Amos v. State, which held that a defendant in a criminal proceeding must have access to his or her attorney no matter how brief the recess, and the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. Leek, which held that a trial court does not violate the Sixth Amendment when it orders a defendant not to consult with his counsel during a short daytime recess taken while the defendant is testifying -- Although Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in Amos after issuance of U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Perry, Amos did not delineate between the federal and state constitutional right to counsel, and district court has a duty to follow U.S. Supreme Court precedent that construes federal constitution -- As such, trial court in instant case did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel -- While it remains unclear whether trial court's brief restriction on defendant's consultation with counsel violated defendant's rights under Florida Constitution, any error in precluding defendant from consulting with his counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt -- Question certified: In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. Leek (holding that a trial court does not violate the Sixth Amendment when it orders a defendant not to consult with his counsel during a short daytime recess taken while the defendant is testifying), does a trial court err under Florida law by barring a defendant from consulting with his counsel during a short daytime recess taken while the defendant is testifying?
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Criminal law -- Search and seizure -- Traffic stop -- Dog sniff -- Prolonged stop -- Trial court erred by denying motion to suppress evidence obtained during traffic stop -- Traffic stop was improperly and unnecessarily prolonged where officer radioed for K-9 four minutes after the stop was initiated, ten minutes and twenty seconds elapsed post-stop before the K-9 exterior sniff of the car began, and state offered no evidence to justify length of delay between stop and K-9 walk around
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Criminal law -- Search and seizure -- Traffic stop -- Failure to maintain single lane -- No error in denying motion to suppress evidence discovered after defendant was stopped for failing to maintain a single lane -- Because officer's testimony was sufficient to show that defendant did not drive his vehicle as “nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane,” the trial court correctly found that the traffic stop was validly based on a section 316.089(1) violation -- Defendant's failure to maintain a single lane did not have to endanger himself or anyone else for there to be a violation of section 316.089(1) and a valid traffic stop -- Conflict certified
VIEW OPINION (login required)

Criminal law -- Trafficking in controlled substance -- Fentanyl -- Judgment of acquittal -- Information charging defendant with trafficking in four grams or more of “fentanyl, or a mixture containing fentanyl, a substance controlled by section 893.03(2)(b)9” -- Trial court erred by denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal where evidence showed that substance in pill bottle discovered on defendant's person was actually para-Fluorofentanyl, a substance listed in section 893.03(1)(a)62 -- Because state narrowed its allegations and specifically identified the controlled substance at issue as “fentanyl, or of a mixture containing fentanyl, a substance controlled by Florida Statute 893.03(2)(b)9,” state had burden to prove defendant had trafficked in fentanyl as described in section 893.03(2)(b) -- State could not satisfy its burden of proof by submitting evidence that defendant trafficked in a fentanyl derivative as described in section 893.03(1)(a)62 -- Court rejects argument that any reference to fentanyl rather than para-Fluorofentanyl is a “distinction without a difference” where the substances appear under different statutes and schedules -- While crime lab analyst testified that para-Fluorofentanyl is a type of fentanyl, totality of testimony established that the substances were indeed different where analyst also testified that the two substances have separate chemical structures which made them different chemically
VIEW OPINION (login required)