Week In Review

Headnotes of selected Florida Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal cases filed the week of
July 27, 2026 - July 31, 2026

Civil Law Headnotes (Jump to Criminal Law Headnotes)

THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
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Attorney's fees -- Contracts -- Retainer agreement -- Trial court did not reversibly err by failing to consider factors identified in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe and its progeny before awarding compensatory damages for breach of contract based upon failure to pay fees negotiated under written retainer agreement
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Churches -- Real property -- Deeds -- Validity -- Standing -- Reversionary interest -- Deed conveying property for use as church containing reverter clause stating that if majority of the membership of a church ceases to follow Baptist faith, majority members shall no longer constitute the “true congregation of said church” and title to property shall vest in minority members who continue adherence to the faith -- Church which conveyed property to defendant lacked standing to bring suit challenging defendant's conveyance of property to another religious organization -- Church lost all rights and legally cognizable interest in property when it conveyed property to defendant as there was simply no provision for the property to revert back to the church itself -- Based on language of deed, property could either revert back to defendant's minority members who continued to adhere to faith or, if no members continued to adhere to faith, a named Baptist organization -- Court rejects argument that church has standing because defendant's minority members assigned their interests to church after church's second amended complaint was dismissed without prejudice -- Assignments were facially insufficient to grant standing to church because rights had not yet been assigned on the date initial complaint was filed -- Relation back doctrine does not grant standing because rule does not permit a party to establish a right to maintain an action retroactively by acquiring standing after the fact -- Even if assignments were sufficient to transfer interest in title, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine would preclude court's jurisdiction -- Ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies not only to churches with hierarchical form of government, but also churches with an autonomous congregational structure such as the Baptist churches in instant case -- Determination of the rights of the assigning minority members inherently requires resolution of doctrinal controversy where minority members' possession of any right or title to property is dependent upon whether they constitute the “true congregation,” and whether they constitute the “true congregation” is dependent upon a determination of whether they have continued to adhere to specific faith and practices
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Judges -- Disqualification -- Successor judge -- Comment on truth of facts asserted in disqualification motion -- Rule 2.330(i) permits a successor judge to rule on truth of facts alleged in support of motion to disqualify if predecessor judge was disqualified for alleged prejudice or partiality “on motion” by the same party -- Rule does not apply in instant case where predecessor judge recused herself sua sponte without ruling on pending disqualification motion -- Accordingly, successor judge erred in addressing and refuting allegations made in petitioner's motion to disqualify before denying it -- Facts alleged, taken as true, were legally sufficient to require that motion be granted -- Jurisdiction -- Judge was not precluded from entering written summary final judgment after motion for disqualification was filed where written judgment merely reflected judge's earlier ruling that petitioner lacked standing
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Wrongful death -- Premises liability -- Public campgrounds -- Sovereign immunity -- Planning-level functions -- Decedent struck and killed by vehicle while using designated crosswalk which spanned highway and connected two separate public camp sites -- Action claiming state agencies knowingly created campgrounds and recreation areas with the knowledge that visitors would walk back and forth across the highway and created an inherently dangerous intersection that does not contain any illumination after dark or traffic signals -- Trial court erred by denying motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds -- Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity because the creation and design of campground, specifically its division by the highway, were discretionary, planning-level functions -- Additionally, agencies' decision to build a road or its design of the road is a planning-level function that provides immunity from tort liability, as is the decision to provide or not provide traffic signaling
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Civil rights -- Public employees -- Firefighters -- Medical marijuana -- Accommodations -- Wrongful termination -- Plaintiff with valid medical marijuana card placed on unpaid administrative leave after random drug screening showed positive result for marijuana -- Collective bargaining agreement defining “prescription and nonprescription medication” as a “drug or medication obtained pursuant to a prescription as defined by section 893.02 or a medication that is authorized pursuant to federal or state law for general distribution and use without a prescription” -- Trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of employee based on its determination that medical marijuana is considered a prescription medication under CBA and, as such, a medical review officer was required to “verify the test as negative”; that state's medical marijuana constitutional amendment affirmatively requires “Qualified Patients” to be allowed to use medical marijuana off-site and correspondingly requires employers to accommodate that use; and that county could not discipline plaintiff based on a positive test absent proof of on-duty impairment -- Under section 893.02, a “prescription” is an order for drugs which meets the requirements of section 893.04 -- Medical marijuana is not a “prescription medication” under CBA because it is not obtained through an order legally capable of being dispensed by a pharmacist licensed under chapter 465 as required by section 893.04 -- Medical marijuana treatment centers do not meet chapter 465's definition of a “special pharmacy” -- Medical marijuana is not a “nonprescription medication” under CBA because it is not authorized for “general distribution and use without a prescription” under state or federal law -- A category limited to medications authorized for “general distribution and use without a prescription” cannot be read as a catchall for any medication that is lawful or available within state -- Because medical marijuana is not a prescription or a nonprescription medication, MRO was not required to report plaintiff's drug test as negative under CBA merely because plaintiff presented a valid medical marijuana card as justification for positive result -- Trial court improperly narrowed scope of CBA in concluding that it only prohibited on-duty use of substances where such an interpretation ignores “at any time while employed” language and nullifies other CBA provisions -- State constitution and section 381.986, the medical marijuana implementing statute, do not create an accommodation mandate -- Fact that article X, section 29(c)(6) states that nothing in the amendment “shall require any accommodation” of medical marijuana use in a place of employment does not mean that amendment requires employers to accommodate off-duty use -- Provision of section 381.986 stating that an employer is not required to accommodate the medical use of marijuana “in any workplace” is not fairly understood as a mere geographic limitation, but rather refers to the employer's workplace rules governing fitness for duty and makes clear that statute does not compel employers to create a medical marijuana exception to those rules -- Even assuming that statutory provision is limited to on-site workplace accommodation, that assumption would not displace the bargained-for, more restrictive substance abuse rules that were adopted for plaintiff's safety-sensitive bargaining unit -- Employers must implement ratified CBA terms even when they are more restrictive than other generally applicable employment rules -- Article X, section 29 does not transform a state law protection against state criminal or civil sanctions into a constitutional entitlement to hold a particular public safety job -- Because no accommodation is required by state's medical marijuana framework, the CBA, or county policy, plaintiff's claim alleging violation of Florida Civil Rights Act cannot stand -- Marijuana-based wrongful termination claim fails as a matter of law where section 381.986 expressly states that it does not create a cause of action against an employer for wrongful discharge or discrimination -- Claim alleging that county failed to update or amend its drug-free workplace policy fails because it seeks an alteration of workplace policy for a coordinate branch of local government, which courts are not empowered to grant -- Based on appellate court's interpretation of CBA, plaintiff's breach of contract claim necessarily fails -- Even if merits of claims were closer than they are, reversal would still be required where trial court granted broad, prospective, and unrequested relief which prohibited county from discriminating against employees who present a valid medical marijuana card after testing positive for marijuana and requiring county to provide accommodations to such employees -- While issue was not preserved for appeal, the granting of such relief constitutes fundamental error
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Contracts -- Property management -- Torts -- Economic loss rule -- Independent tort doctrine -- Corporations -- Liability of officers and employees -- Action alleging breach of contract and negligence brought by trustee against corporation which had contracted to manage, operate, and lease rental properties held in trust and against individual officer and employee in her role as property manager and as licensed realtor who sold four of the homes without knowledge or consent of the trust -- Trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's breach of contract claim against corporation on ground that, because management agreement did not specifically address sale of rental homes, corporation could not breach the agreement by improperly selling the rental homes -- By selling rental homes, corporation transferred control of them and thus broke its contractual obligation to “manage, operate and lease” the homes -- Moreover, complaint identified additional provisions of management agreement breached by corporation, including failing to properly account for rental income, transferring rental income without authorization, and improperly retaining security deposits, all of which matched specific obligations listed in management agreement -- Negligence -- Trial court did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's negligence claim against corporation -- Florida courts require that tort claims brought between parties in contractual privity be “independent” of any breach of contract, and plaintiff failed to plead factual basis demonstrating corporation owed general duty to plaintiff independent of any contractual obligation -- Finally, damages pled in negligence claim are economic in nature and identical to the damages sought under contract -- Plaintiff failed to identify any broader societal interest previously recognized as sufficient to override application of a boundary doctrine that, if enforced, would preclude a tort claim -- Extensive discussion of independent tort doctrine -- Trial court did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's negligence claim against individual officer and employee who was tasked with carrying out corporation's contractual duties -- Independent tort doctrine shielded this individual from liability from torts arising solely from her negligent performance of management agreement as an employee, even though individual was not party to contract -- Remand to allow plaintiff's breach of contract claim against corporation to proceed -- Questions certified: 1) In applying the independent tort doctrine, how should courts distinguish an “independent” tort from a “dependent” tort? 2) Does the independent tort doctrine shield officers and employees who are not a party to a contract when their liability in tort arises solely from their deficient performance of a contractual duty assumed by a corporation that was a party to the contract and on whose behalf they were acting?
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Contracts -- Software development -- Discovery -- Confidential information -- Trade secrets -- Source codes -- Action alleging defendant failed to deliver suitable source code for web and mobile application collaboration, forcing plaintiff to incur expense of hiring in-house developers to develop a usable code -- Counterclaim for unpaid additional development work -- Trial court's order compelling plaintiff to produce complete copy of code repository of its application in native, electronic format to defendant affirmed except as to confidentiality aspect of order -- In context, trial court did not depart from essential requirements of law by failing to conduct in-camera review and make findings in its order regarding whether requested information constituted trade secret where neither party requested such review and both court and parties operated under assumption that source code constituted a trade secret if it was, in fact, developed exclusively by plaintiff's in-house team -- Trial court correctly determined that there was reasonable necessity for production since plaintiff's own expert could not determine whether app was developed through pre-termination efforts of defendant without first reviewing underlying code -- Protection of confidentiality -- Confidentiality aspects of order quashed, as requiring that repository be broadly distributed to defendant as an entity, rather than to defendant's designated expert, creates palpable and irreparable risk of misappropriation -- On remand, trial court to prescribe more narrowly tailored prohibition on dissemination
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Insurance -- Torts -- Automobile accident -- Attorney's fees -- Joinder of parties -- Insurers -- No error in denying plaintiff's request to join insurer to judgment awarding attorney's fees against the insured based on the rejection of a proposal for settlement in underlying personal injury action -- Policy expressly states that the settlement-and-defense expenses insurer will pay do “not include attorney's fees awarded or assessed against an insured person” -- Subsequent paragraph of policy which states that insurer will pay “reasonable expenses” that are “incurred at insurer's request” cannot reasonably be read to silently restore the very category of adverse attorney's fee liability that preceding paragraph expressly addresses -- Because the policy does not cover the attorney's fee portion of the judgment, section 627.4136(4) supplies no basis to join insurer to that judgment
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Judges -- Disqualification -- Successor judge -- Comment on truth of facts asserted in disqualification motion -- Rule 2.330(i) permits a successor judge to rule on truth of facts alleged in support of motion to disqualify if predecessor judge was disqualified for alleged prejudice or partiality “on motion” by the same party -- Rule does not apply in instant case where predecessor judge recused herself sua sponte without ruling on pending disqualification motion -- Accordingly, successor judge erred in addressing and refuting allegations made in petitioner's motion to disqualify before denying it -- Facts alleged, taken as true, were legally sufficient to require that motion be granted -- Jurisdiction -- Judge was not precluded from entering written summary final judgment after motion for disqualification was filed where written judgment merely reflected judge's earlier ruling that petitioner lacked standing
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Torts -- Amendment of complaint to seek punitive damages -- Action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and negligence based on incident in which defendants allegedly suddenly attacked plaintiff as she was walking her dog along neighborhood sidewalk based on mistaken belief that plaintiff had yelled at defendants' son earlier that day -- Reasonable basis -- Trial court did not err in allowing plaintiff to assert claim for punitive damages against father where evidence of father's physical and verbal conduct, viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff, could reasonably support finding that father committed intentional misconduct or gross negligence -- Trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to plead punitive damage claim against mother where plaintiff did not proffer evidence that mother, personally, had done anything more than spit in plaintiff's face twice
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Wrongful death -- Premises liability -- Public campgrounds -- Sovereign immunity -- Planning-level functions -- Decedent struck and killed by vehicle while using designated crosswalk which spanned highway and connected two separate public camp sites -- Action claiming state agencies knowingly created campgrounds and recreation areas with the knowledge that visitors would walk back and forth across the highway and created an inherently dangerous intersection that does not contain any illumination after dark or traffic signals -- Trial court erred by denying motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds -- Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity because the creation and design of campground, specifically its division by the highway, were discretionary, planning-level functions -- Additionally, agencies' decision to build a road or its design of the road is a planning-level function that provides immunity from tort liability, as is the decision to provide or not provide traffic signaling
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Criminal Law Headnotes (Jump to Civil Law Headnotes)

THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
To see others not presented here, log in for more comprehensive weekly listings.

Criminal law -- Search and seizure -- Citizen's arrest -- Breach of peace -- Officer acting outside jurisdiction -- Defendant detained by off-duty police officer in a county outside his jurisdiction after officer's daughter told him that someone was trying to break into his patrol car and, upon walking outside his home, officer observed defendant enter neighbor's back yard through gate while appearing under the influence -- Trial court erred by denying motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a citizen's arrest -- Citizen's arrest lacked lawful basis where no felony was observed and defendant's conduct did not constitute a breach of the peace -- Fingerprints and smudges later found on officer's patrol car cannot be relied upon to justify citizen's arrest where officer stated he did not examine his car or see defendant trying to break in prior to arrest -- Officer's daughter informing him that someone had been trying to break in was not a personal observation to support arrest -- While officer observed defendant on his property, defendant was already in process of leaving when officer saw him, and that conduct could have resulted in no more than a trespass warning -- Defendant's entering of neighbor's yard while appearing intoxicated did not rise to level of breach of peace where defendant's conduct and intoxication did not clearly endanger the public -- Mere intoxication in public does not constitute a breach of peace -- Defendant's act of approaching an elderly woman in the common area of the property did not constitute a breach of peace where defendant made no threats toward woman -- Incident to arrest -- Trial court erred in determining that discovery of stun gun on defendant's person was protected based on lawful search incident to arrest conducted by on-duty police officers after discovering a pill bottle in the area where off-duty officer said defendant had thrown it -- Defendant's abandonment of pill bottle was involuntary where bottle was not discarded until after he complied with off-duty officer's unlawful command to stop -- Because abandonment of pill bottle was involuntary, discovery of stun gun is not shielded from Fourth Amendment protections as a search incident to arrest
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