THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
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Administrative law -- Public Service Commission -- Public utilities -- Gas -- Rate plans -- Reserve imbalance -- Depreciation Rule -- Public Service Commission did not err by approving gas utility's use of Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism-Adjusted Depreciation Parameters or Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism in its proposed rate plan -- Approval of the RSAM-ADP was not inconsistent with the Depreciation Rule based on fact that RSAM-ADP created a reserve imbalance surplus -- Nothing in the Depreciation Rule prohibits Commission from approving depreciation parameters that result in a reserve imbalance surplus -- Record establishes that utility and Commission complied with their obligations under Depreciation Rule where utility filed a depreciation study which discussed proposed transfers of reserve between categories or accounts intended to correct deficient or surplus reserve balances, and Commission investigated the possibility of a corrective reserve transfer prior to changing depreciation rates -- Commission's approval of RSAM-ADP and the RSAM are not inconsistent with Commission's official policy or alleged prior practice of only approving an RSAM within a settlement agreement -- Commission's decision was not a departure from officially stated policy, but a selection from within a range of permissible policy choices -- Language in a prior Commission order which stated that a reserve imbalance “violates the matching principle” and “should be corrected” does not qualify as an officially stated agency policy -- While Commission has on prior occasions approved requests for RSAM-ADP and RSAM when they have been advanced in the context of a settlement agreement, its decision to approve them here does not contravene prior Commission practice -- Because legislature controls Commission's jurisdiction and authority, Commission's prior decisions to settle or litigate a case have no bearing on whether Commission maintains jurisdiction and authority to approve rates -- Commission's approval of RSAM-ADP and the RSAM are supported by competent substantial evidence and rationally connected to a conclusion that is articulated in a reasoned explanation -- Commission's continuation of acquisition adjustment, which is an accounting adjustment related to a corporate transaction, was not inconsistent with official policy -- Prior orders stating that acquisition adjustments do not survive subsequent purchases of the utility's assets do not establish the contended policy where those orders addressed water and wastewater utilities which, unlike gas utilities, have specific set of rules regulating when and how acquisition adjustments can be approved, and it is not clear from those orders that the Commission intended for them to establish a universal policy for all utilities -- Additionally, Commission has a history of continuing acquisition adjustments in gas utilities context -- Commission's continuation of acquisition adjustment was supported by competent substantial evidence
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Contracts -- Indemnity -- Torts -- Premises liability -- Trip and fall -- Action brought against store and service provider the store had contracted with to inspect store's premises -- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment against defendant store on its crossclaim for contractual indemnity against co-defendant service provider based on determination that, because co-defendant owed no duty to plaintiff, co-defendant owed no contractual indemnity to defendant -- Whether co-defendant owed a duty to plaintiff is irrelevant as contractual indemnity is not concerned with special relationships or vicarious, constructive, derivative, or technical liability, but is instead concerned with the express terms of the agreement to indemnify -- Given the clear, unambiguous language of the indemnification provision and defendant's allegations that co-defendant failed to comply with its contractual duty to notify defendant of the dangerous condition which allegedly caused plaintiff to trip and fall, coupled with co-defendant's failure to meet its initial burden to either produce evidence that it did not fail to comply with the contract or point out that defendant lacked the evidence to prove it failed to comply with the contract, co-defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
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Florida Bar -- Rules -- Amendment -- Trust Accounts
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Gambling -- Pari-mutuel wagering -- Permits -- Revocation -- Constitutionality of statute -- Special laws -- Trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Gaming Control Commission on constitutional challenge to section 550.054(9)(c)'s permit revocation provision, which required pari-mutuel wagering permits to be revoked from permit holders that hadn't operated in the 2020-2021 fiscal year -- Statute's revocation language does not constitute an unconstitutional special law because, although it only applies to a narrow known class of nine permit holders statewide, it subsisted within legislature's wider scheme for updating state's regulation of gaming to align with a constitutional amendment and the 2021 gaming compact between the state and the Seminole Tribe of Florida, and because scheme restricts permits from old and new entrants alike from the pari-mutuel wagering space -- Due process -- Court rejects substantive due process argument alleging that state unconstitutionally infringed on plaintiff's property interest in its pari-mutuel gaming permit via a law that wasn't rationally related to a legitimate government interest -- Plaintiff does not have a protected property right at stake in its pari-mutuel wagering permit -- Because pari-mutuel betting is a state-granted privilege, the state does not forfeit its right to withdraw those benefits or qualify them as it chooses -- Furthermore, statute doesn't violate plaintiff's due process rights because it reasonably relates to the permissible legislative goal of regulating gaming -- State did not violate plaintiff's right to procedural due process where legislative process itself, which involved a special session of the legislature with its attendant legislative notice- and hearing-related processes, provided due process -- Impairment of contract -- Court rejects plaintiff's impairment of contract argument where plaintiff failed to identify a contract impaired by the passage of the statute -- While record indicated that plaintiff had discussed selling its permit with a potential buyer leading to a letter of intent, no contract was entered via the letter
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Insurance -- Homeowners -- Property insurance -- Assignment -- Assignee's action against insurer -- Validity of assignment -- Section 627.7152, which regulates initial insured-to-contractor assignments, also regulates subsequent transfers of post-loss benefits -- In case at issue, purchase agreement in which service provider transferred its right to payment of post-loss benefits to appellee, a business which buys receivables from service providers and pursues payment for outstanding balances, qualified as an “assignment agreement” -- Agreement was invalid and unenforceable where it failed to comply with requirements of statute -- Remand for entry of summary judgment for insurer
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Labor relations -- Public employees -- Arbitration -- Government in the Sunshine Law -- Trial court erred by entering declaratory judgment that section 286.011(1) requires arbitration hearings between a public employer and a public employee union to be open to the public -- Statute does not require arbitrations to be open to the public because an arbitrator is not a “board or commission” -- Section 447.605(2) does not require arbitrations to be open to the public because an individual employee's arbitration hearing is not within the definition of “collective bargaining negotiations” -- Supreme court's decision in Galbreath v. School Board of Broward County does not govern analysis of sections 286.011(1) or 447.605(2) in instant case where Galbreath did not purport to interpret those statutes; neither of those statutory provisions includes the words “negotiation” or “negotiations,” and the analyses did not purport to define those words; and Galbreath expressly distinguishes between “the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement” and “the administration of the agreement through the grievance-arbitration procedure,” which supports a definitional distinction between those collective bargaining concepts
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Landlord-tenant -- Attorney's fees -- Prevailing party -- Reduction of fees -- Trial court erred by reducing attorneys' reasonable hourly rate based on independent research of attorneys' listed experience on their online Bar profiles, and by reducing the number of hours reasonably expended without explanation -- Record shows that trial court was improperly predisposed to a set fee regardless of time expended, and improperly suggested that it would find the landlord did not prevail if the attorneys would not agree to the trial court's idea of a reasonable fee -- Trial court is bound to apply the lodestar method in determining fees, not its own sense of reasonableness or what the relationship of the award to the underlying judgment amount should be -- Neither the trial court's commentary at the fee hearing nor the order provides a sufficient explanation for the trial court's fee award -- Even assuming trial court's rationale for the specific time entries was justified, those few time entries did not account for the significant reduction in the attorneys' time -- Costs -- Trial court erred in failing to award requested taxable court costs associated with a filing fee, service of process, court reporting, and transcripts without sufficient articulated justification
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Mortgage foreclosure -- Sale -- Surplus funds -- Entitlement -- Subordinate lienholders -- Municipal corporations -- Code violation liens -- Trial court did not err in determining that city was not entitled to surplus funds to satisfy code violation liens which were filed after filing of lis pendens and entry of initial final judgment of foreclosure -- Discussion of sections 45.031 and 45.032 -- With regard to code enforcement liens, city was not a “subordinate lienholder” within meaning of section 45.032(1)(b) where lien was not shown on face of pleadings -- Reference to “claim” in subsection 48.032(2), which grants priority over surplus funds to “subordinate lienholders who have timely filed a claim,” must be read together with definitional limitation of a “subordinate lienholder” set forth in subsection (1)(b) -- As such, a “claim” under subsection (2) can mean only a claim asserted by a subordinate lienholder in their capacity as “a holder of a subordinate lien shown on the face of the pleadings as an encumbrance on the property” -- City could not bootstrap code enforcement lien to earlier recorded utilities lien referenced in the pleadings
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Real property -- Partition -- Distribution of proceeds -- Setoffs and credits -- Foreclosure payments -- Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellee credit for full amount appellee paid to bring property out of foreclosure where payment was not made as part of appellee's proportional obligation as a cotenant, but rather to cure appellant's default under long-standing expense-sharing agreement which allocated responsibility for mortgage payments to appellant -- Ouster -- Rental credits -- Trial court's award of appellee's actual rental expenses reflected an incorrect application of law -- Proper measure of compensation for ouster is reasonable rental value of the subject property, not the ousted cotenant's actual rental expenses -- Because appellee failed to establish reasonable rental value of subject property despite having had opportunity to do so, award of rental credit must be reversed
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Small claims rules -- Amendment -- Method of service of process
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Torts -- Premises liability -- Slip and fall -- Leased premises -- Landlord's duty of care -- Plaintiff, who was an employee of tenant restaurant which leased premises from defendant landlord, brought action against landlord after he slipped in water which had allegedly dripped down from a leak in roof of leased premises -- Trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of defendant based on finding that defendant owed no legal duty to plaintiff because the leak originated from a hood vent in kitchen, and lease required tenant to maintain vent -- Landlord owed a duty to timely investigate the cause of the leak because, under the lease, landlord retained exclusive authority to access the roof and investigate the source of the leak -- Tenant could not have discovered that leak originated from the hood vent until landlord entered onto the roof to investigate
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Criminal Law Headnotes (Jump to Civil Law Headnotes)
THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
To see others not presented here, log in for more comprehensive weekly listings.
Criminal law -- Civil restitution lien -- Cost of incarceration -- Jurisdiction -- Limitation of actions -- Trial court did not err by granting Department of Corrections' motion for civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.292 -- Trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to enter the civil restitution lien under section 960.292 at any time during the term of defendant's sentence -- Court rejects argument that, because statute is silent as to any time limit for entering the civil restitution lien and because the lien is civil in nature, lien should be subject to the four-year statute of limitations provided for civil actions founded on statutory liability and that time begins to run on the date of conviction -- Because DOC filed its motion pursuant to section 960.292 in the sentencing court, as opposed to bringing a separate civil action under section 960.297, the general four-year statute of limitations period for civil actions under section 95.11(3)(f) has no place in this proceeding
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Criminal law -- Evidence -- Audio recordings -- Trial court abused its discretion by admitting audio recording of defendant which was made in his home without his knowledge or consent by victim's minor daughter -- Recording qualified as an intercepted oral communication made with an expectation of privacy and, therefore, was inadmissible -- Remand for new trial
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