Week In Review

Headnotes of selected Florida Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal cases filed the week of
August 31, 2026 - September 4, 2026

Civil Law Headnotes (Jump to Criminal Law Headnotes)

THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
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Civil procedure -- Vexatious Litigant Act -- Trial court's determination that appellant was a vexatious litigant under under § 68.093 was supported by competent, substantial evidence, and sanctions imposed by the court were expressly authorized by the Vexatious Litigant Act -- Further, given appellant's clear abuse of judicial process, trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing additional non-statutory sanctions -- Trial court has both the inherent authority and a duty to limit abuse of judicial process by pro se litigants -- Trial court did not err in instructing lower court clerk to deactivate appellant's e-filing privileges to ensure compliance with provisions barring appellant from pro se filings -- Due process -- Imposition of sanctions under court's inherent authority without issuing show cause order separate from appellee's motion and notice of hearing on that motion did not constitute a denial of due process in context of instant case -- Issuance of show cause order would have been unnecessarily duplicative where both title and body of appellee's motion to declare appellant a vexatious litigant clearly sought imposition of specific sanctions under trial court's inherent authority, appellant had opportunity to respond to that motion and did so, and trial court held a noticed hearing on the motion at which appellant, had she chosen to attend, could have argued her opposition to the sanctions
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Partition -- Real property -- Former marital home -- Trial court presiding over former wife's independent partition action erred in partitioning former marital residence where home was purchased solely in former husband's name and former husband remained sole named grantee on title at time dissolution of marriage action was filed and after entry of final judgment in the dissolution of marriage action -- Partition action under section 64.031 may be filed only by “joint tenants, tenants in common, or coparceners” -- Former wife was never a joint owner of property, and classification of the property as marital by trial court in dissolution action did not, by itself, create any type of joint ownership -- Final judgment of partition reversed
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Public records -- Exemptions -- Materials obtained by law enforcement agencies during course of criminal investigation -- Search and seizure -- Injunctions -- Trial court erred by enjoining police department and state attorney's office from releasing records and data obtained from three search warrants issued during criminal investigation of appellee, and ordering destruction of those records, based on determination that warrants violated appellee's Fourth Amendment rights -- Discussion of article I, section 24 of the state constitution, chapter 119, and the Fourth Amendment -- Data police department copied, flagged as relevant, and reviewed as part of its criminal investigation into appellee were “public records,” and there is no statutory exemption for public records that were allegedly obtained in violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights -- Fourth Amendment does not operate as a free-floating unenacted public records exemption and no statute authorizes exclusionary rule's application in a civil public records dispute -- While appellee could have brought a civil rights action or filed a criminal complaint against officers who allegedly violated his civil rights, he could not thwart a public records request as a third party and obtain extraordinary equitable relief in a civil action under the guise of vindicating his right to return property -- Furthermore, issue of whether Fourth Amendment or any other federal constitutional rights applied was never set forth in pleadings or tried by consent -- Standing -- No state authority has ever held that a third party has standing to contest a public records request by virtue of a purported property right in their digital information that was allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment -- Even assuming appellee could properly bring lawsuit to challenge release of public records, holding does not change because data does not fall under any recognized exemption -- Evidence -- Spousal privilege -- Trial court erred in alternatively ruling that spousal privilege prohibited disclosure of messages between appellee and his wife -- Spousal privilege is a law that governs the admissibility of evidence in legal proceedings, not a law that limits public access to records or meetings
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Rules of Civil Procedure -- Amendment -- Service and filing of pleadings, orders, documents, and transcripts -- Time
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Torts -- Premises liability -- Duty to warn -- Open and obvious condition -- Special relationship -- Owner of Florida resort did not have duty to warn or protect barefoot guest from a hot cement pool deck and beach sand under the Florida summer sun -- Trial court properly dismissed with prejudice an action against defendants who either owned, operated, or were involved in development or operation of resort brought by plaintiff who suffered from diabetic neuropathy and did not feel heat beneath his feet when he routinely stood on and walked barefoot across cement pool deck to beach sand -- Plaintiff's medical condition did not transform an otherwise ordinary and obvious condition into a dangerous one or create a special duty on part of landowner
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Criminal Law Headnotes (Jump to Civil Law Headnotes)

THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
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Criminal law -- Driving under influence -- Search and seizure -- Blood draw -- Trial court did not err by granting defendant's motion to suppress blood draw results as fruits of an unreasonable search where law enforcement did not apply for search warrant, but instead had first responders compel blood draw after defendant refused to submit voluntarily -- Discussion of section 316.1933(1) and appellate court's holding in State v. Acevedo -- Court's holding in Acevedo did not create a “probable cause” exception to warrant requirement for blood draws -- To extent language of opinion suggests otherwise, the appellate court recedes from that language -- A warrant is required to obtain a blood draw unless exigent circumstances or actual consent exists -- Natural dissipation of alcohol in blood did not constitute exigent circumstance in instant case -- Statutory implied consent cannot serve as a substitute for actual consent or warrant
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Criminal law -- Second degree murder -- Depraved mind -- Victim shot by defendant following defendant's call to law enforcement after victim crossed into defendant's property while physically threatening defendant, defendant's sister, and her child -- Trial court erred by denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal where state did not prove depraved mind element of crime -- In absence of history of animosity toward victim or circumstantial evidence of malice beyond the act itself, evidence established an impulsive overreaction to a perceived threat during a sudden and volatile domestic crisis, not the ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent that second-degree murder requires -- While defendant told his mother he would shoot victim if alleged victim forced his way inside the home, a statement of conditional intent to protect one's family against a feared forced entry is not evidence of ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent toward the victim -- Evidence supported conviction of manslaughter rather than second-degree murder -- Evidence -- Argument that state committed fundamental error by presenting evidence that defendant was under the influence of marijuana at time of shooting and arguing that drug affected defendant's perception and reaction time was unpreserved and lacks merit
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Criminal law -- Sexual offenders -- Registration requirements -- Removal -- Appeals -- Jurisdiction -- Trial court erred by denying Florida Department of Law Enforcement's motion to vacate order directing it to remove petitioner from sexual offender registry based on determination that state attorney, not FDLE, has standing to challenge removal from sexual offender registry pursuant to section 943.0436 -- Appellate court has jurisdiction to review order denying motion to vacate because the sexual offender registration proceedings giving rise to appealed order are civil, not criminal, in nature -- While section 943.0436 permits a sexual offender to petition the criminal division of the circuit court for purpose of removing registration requirement, a petition filed in the criminal division does not transform an otherwise civil regulatory proceeding into a criminal proceeding -- Standing -- FDLE had standing to challenge removal order in trial court because section 943.0436(3) expressly recognizes FDLE's authority to challenge an order affecting its statutory duties, and challenged order directly affected FDLE's statutory duties to maintain the sexual offender registry -- Legislature's authorization of state attorney's ability to oppose a petition does not negate FDLE's independent duty to maintain the registry -- FDLE has standing to appeal denial of motion as a nonparty because trial court's order directly adjudicates its rights -- Eligibility for removal -- Applicable statute -- Trial court erred by applying version of section 943.0435 in effect at time petitioner's supervision ended in determining that defendant was eligible for removal from sexual offender registry -- Because current version of section 943.0435 is procedural, it may be applied retroactively so long as doing so does not impair vested rights -- Petitioner did not satisfy statute's eligibility requirements where he had been convicted of sexual battery and had not been released from sanction for twenty-five years when he filed his petition
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