THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
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Civil procedure -- Discovery -- Text messages -- Non-parties -- Attorney-client privilege -- Work product -- Appeals -- Certiorari -- Trial court departed from essential requirements of the law by categorically denying non-party's privilege assertions and ordering production of disputed Slack messages without first conducting an in-camera inspection -- Messaging communications between a new company's owner and CEO about legal advice previously received by the owner may be privileged -- Furthermore, where communications concern a rival company that has a long-running dispute with the new company's owner, and has recently sued and settled with new company's CEO, those communications may be protected work product if they “respond to some event which foreseeably could be made the basis of a claim in the future,” even if made months before any such claim ripens into litigation -- Availability of attorney-client privilege did not depend on the participation of an attorney in every communication for which privilege was claimed -- Applicability of work product doctrine did not depend on the participation of an attorney in every communication or document for which protection was claimed or the commencement of anticipated litigation within a certain period of time
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Contracts -- Construction -- Enforcement -- Defenses -- Unlicensed contractors -- Action alleging that defendant, an unlicensed contractor, had breached contract by failing to remove and replace rejected marble flooring its licensed subcontractors had installed -- Trial court erred by denying plaintiff's motion in limine which sought to preclude defendant from asserting any contractual defenses at trial -- Defendant could not present defenses that it could not legally enforce under section 489.128
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Contracts -- Mortgages -- Insurance -- Third-party beneficiary -- Trial court did not err by dismissing borrower's third-party beneficiary breach of contract action against insurer -- Because contract at issue was a lender-placed insurance policy, the insured was the lender, not the borrower -- Borrower lacked standing to file action as third-party beneficiary because there was no clear or manifest intent of the contracting parties that the policy primarily and directly benefit borrower -- Fact that borrower directly benefits from some provisions of a special form which provide coverage for borrower's personal property and living expenses is insufficient because policy as a whole doe not manifest intent to primarily and directly benefit borrower -- Because conferring a benefit on borrower was not the direct and primary object of the contracting parties, borrower has no legally enforceable right in subject matter of the contract, and any benefit borrower reaped from contract was merely incidental -- Borrower did not have standing as a third-party beneficiary based on his insurable interest in the property where policy was expressly issued pursuant to surplus lines law -- Under plain language of 626.913(4), the insurable interest provision found in chapter 627 is inapplicable -- Contracting parties were not required to express clear intent not to benefit borrower in the policy
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Rules of Traffic Court -- Amendment -- Discovery -- Infractions only -- Citations -- Identification of speed-measuring device used
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Torts -- Medical malpractice -- Jurisdiction -- Non-residents -- Action brought against non-resident doctors that treated and evaluated patient in New York before referring patient to a Florida provider after patient had moved -- No error in dismissing action for lack of personal jurisdiction -- Causing injury in state -- Service activities -- Non-resident doctors were not subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)6.a. -- Doctors' alleged acts of referring patient to an in-state treatment center, performing tests and rendering reports that were used by in-state providers, and sending medical bills to patient while she was in Florida did not establish that doctors were engaged in service activities within the state -- Fact that record of service activity that occurred in a foreign state entered Florida does not retroactively change the location where the service activity occurred -- Similarly, sending a bill to a person in Florida for a service activity that occurred in a foreign state does not change location where service activity occurred -- Doctors' act of “contacting” in-state providers about doctors' diagnosis and opinions did not constitute service activity within state -- An unspecified form of contact initiated outside of Florida to someone located in Florida through an unspecified medium does not constitute a “service activity within” the state under section 48.193(1)(a)6.a. -- Additionally, plaintiff failed to allege a temporal connection between patient's injuries and the “service activities” of the doctors as required by the statute -- Use of products, materials, or things in state -- Doctors were not subject to personal jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a)6.b. where plaintiff failed to allege that injuries occurred “at or about the time” that any products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant were used in Florida -- Even if temporal connection had been alleged, complaint failed to allege that products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the doctors were used in Florida -- While a written report is a “thing,” the writing of a report does not constitute “processing,” “servicing,” or “manufacturing” -- Conflict certified -- Tortious act in state -- Doctors were not subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)2. based on fact that their alleged medical malpractice in New York continued to injure patient when she moved to Florida -- Court rejects argument that a person who commits a tortious act outside Florida that causes injury in Florida has “committed a tortious act within” Florida under section 48.193(1)(a)2. -- Statute necessarily focuses on where a defendant committed an act, not where the injuries from that act may be felt -- Doctors did not commit tortious acts within state by directing communications into Florida where complaint does not alleged that doctors sent or otherwise directed their reports into Florida -- Doctors' “contact” with Florida healthcare providers did not subject doctors to trial court's jurisdiction where complaint did not allege that doctors committed any tortious act during that unspecified form of contact
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Criminal Law Headnotes (Jump to Civil Law Headnotes)

THESE ARE NOT ALL OF THE CASES RELEASED BY THE COURTS FOR THE WEEK.
To see others not presented here, log in for more comprehensive weekly listings.

Criminal law -- Aggravated battery -- Dismissal -- Limitation of actions -- Appeals -- Nolo contendere plea -- Dispositive issues -- Defendant charged in 2023 with committing sexual battery on physically helpless victim in 2005 following DNA “hit” linking him to rape kit collected shortly after the crime -- Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss where state failed to prove by competent, substantial evidence that statute of limitations did not bar prosecution -- Alhough state argued that two statutory exceptions to limitaitons period applied because crime was reported within 72 hours and prosecution was commenced within one year after defendant had been identified through DNA, the only evidence offered in support of that argument was inadmissible hearsay within judicially-noticed court file -- Fact that trial court takes judicial notice of court file does not defeat hearsay objection to its contents -- With respect to state's argument that order on motion to dismiss is not dispositive and, consequently, not appealable, trial court's determination of dispositive nature of issue must be given substantial deference
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Criminal law -- Lewd or lascivious molestation of child under age twelve -- Evidence -- Video -- Ring camera footage -- Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion in limine seeking to exclude former wife's Ring camera footage of incident giving rise to charge against defendant on ground that former wife violated Florida's marital privilege when she gave footage to victim's father -- Marital privilege imposes limitations on one spouse's ability to testify against the other spouse regarding marital communications and does not extend so far as to require exclusion of evidence stemming from such communications -- Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed state to refer to victim as defendant's niece, although familial relationship was not element of charge against defendant, because references provided backdrop for babysitting context in which incident occurred -- Trial court did not err in denying motion for judgment of acquittal -- Evidence was legally sufficient to sustain conviction under sections 800.04(5)(a) and (b) -- Sentencing -- Considerations -- Victim's age -- Double counting -- No sentencing error occurred where trial court imposed lawful sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to legislature's expressed sentencing options for violation of section 800.04(5)(b), a life felony -- Accordingly, defendant's argument that victim's age was double-counted because age was element of charged offense and also considered by trial court prior to imposing sentence does not affect outcome
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Criminal law -- Trafficking in controlled substance -- Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal which asserted that substance defendant was alleged to have trafficked, Dimethylpentylone, was not an enumerated controlled substance under section 893.03(1)(c)191. -- Although Dimethylpentylone is not a substance listed in statute, expert testimony established that Dimethylpentylone's chemical structure met criteria to qualify as a “substituted cathinone,” which is listed in statute -- Statute is not unconstitutionally vague, and being convicted of possessing a substance not specifically listed as prohibited under section 893.03(1)(c)191. does not constitute a denial due process -- Fact that statute criminalizes substances based on their molecular structures, of which a common person in possession of these substances would be unaware, does not make it unconstitutional -- Sentencing -- Habitual felony offender -- Defendant is not entitled to new sentencing proceeding based on fact that a judge, rather than a jury, found that defendant qualified as an HFO -- While trial court should have convened a jury to designate defendant has an HFO following U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. U.S., the failure to do so was harmless given that evidence conclusively established that defendant qualified as an HFO
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